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Blind Justice: Virginia’s Jury 
Sentencing Scheme and 
Impermissible Burdens on a 
Defendant’s Right to a Jury Trial† 
Mitchell E. McCloy  
Abstract 
This Note argues that Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing 
scheme, which bars juries from reviewing state sentencing 
guidelines, impermissibly burdens a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial. By analyzing both judge and 
jury sentencing guidelines compliance rates from the past 
twenty-five years, this Note demonstrates that in Virginia, a 
defendant has a significantly higher chance of receiving a 
harsher sentence after a jury trial than after a bench trial or a 
guilty plea. Given that judges rarely modify jury sentences, the 
defendant is effectively left with a choice between two different 
sentences before plea negotiations can even begin.  
Because it creates this disparity, Virginia’s mandatory jury 
sentencing scheme is unconstitutional. Jury sentencing may 
serve a legitimate purpose by empowering a decision maker more 
in touch with the “conscience of the community” than a judge—
 
 †  This Note received the 2020 Washington and Lee Law Council Law 
Review Award for outstanding student Note.  
  J.D. Candidate, Class of 2021, Washington and Lee University School 
of Law; B.A., Class of 2016, Princeton University. Thank you to Professor 
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the writing process. I also must thank Allan Zaleski for originally suggesting 
this topic to Professor Bruck and for providing invaluable feedback as I wrote 
my Note. A special thank you to my family and friends for their continued love 
and support. 
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the jury. But by limiting the jury’s ability to review sentencing 
guidelines and to make further modifications to sentences, this 
particular jury sentencing scheme fails to serve this legitimate 
purpose and is, therefore, unconstitutional.  
During the Virginia General Assembly’s 2020 Regular 
Session and a 2020 Special Session, lawmakers introduced a 
variety of bills to modify jury sentencing. Among other things, 
the bills would make jury sentencing optional for defendants. 
This Note assesses those bills and determines whether they 
adequately address the constitutional problem created by 
Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing scheme.  
The Note cautions against a rosy impression of jury 
sentencing. Instead, both academic and political figures must 
reckon with the possibility that political actors could exploit the 
practice to threaten a defendant’s fundamental right to a jury 
trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2019, jurors convicted Antron Adon Tucker of 
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, 
transporting meth into Virginia, and possessing marijuana with 
the intent to distribute.1 The jurors recommended a 
fifty-one-year sentence for Tucker.2 Virginia’s sentencing 
 
 1. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, SWVA 
TODAY (Nov. 29, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZAA7-T5XX (describing Antron Adon 
Tucker’s case and sentence).  
 2. Id.  
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guidelines, which the jurors could not review,3 recommended a 
six-year sentence.4 Virginia judges have the discretion to modify 
the jury’s “recommended” sentence by, for example, suspending 
the sentence in part or in full or by ordering that a defendant 
serve sentences for multiple offenses concurrently.5 The judge 
in Tucker’s case chose to fully impose the jury’s sentence.6  
In June 2017, jurors convicted Norell Sterling Ward of two 
counts of possessing heroin with the intent to distribute and one 
count of conspiracy to distribute.7 The jurors recommended a 
sixty-five-year sentence for Ward.8 Virginia’s sentencing 
guidelines recommended a sentence of eight years and six 
months.9 At a hearing, the judge chose not to suspend any of the 
jury’s recommended sentence, but he did order Ward to serve 
the two possession counts concurrently.10 This, along with the 
untouched twenty-five-year recommended sentence for the 
 
 3. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (“In cases tried by a jury, 
the jury shall not be presented any information regarding sentencing 
guidelines.”). 
 4. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, supra 
note 1 (“State sentencing guidelines recommended a punishment of six years 
in prison, but Tucker opted for a jury trial.”).  
 5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (“After conviction, whether with or 
without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the 
sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on 
probation under such conditions as the court shall determine . . . .”); id. 
§ 19.2-308 (“When any person is convicted of two or more offenses, and 
sentenced to confinement, such sentences shall not run concurrently, unless 
expressly ordered by the court.”). 
 6. See Convicted Drug Dealer Gets 51-Year Sentence in Wythe, supra 
note 1 (stating the judge’s decision and quoting the judge as saying that he 
took the jury’s recommendation “very seriously”).  
 7. See Sean Gorman, Heroin Dealer from Charlottesville Sentenced to 45 
Years, DAILY PROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/XA8S-82SP 
(explaining that a jury found the defendant guilty of three felonies).  
 8. See id. (describing the sixty-five-year sentence that was originally 
recommended by the jury but that the judge later slightly lowered).  
 9. See VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, 
NORELL STERLING WARD (2017) [hereinafter VCSC WARD SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES SUMMARY] (providing a summary of Norell Sterling Ward’s 
convictions and the sentencing guidelines recommended punishment).   
 10. See Gorman, supra note 7. 
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conspiracy charge, resulted in a forty-five-year punishment for 
Ward.11  
In March 2012, jurors convicted Robert Via Jr. of 
conspiracy, armed burglary, robbery, four counts of abduction, 
and firearms charges.12 The jurors recommended a 128-year 
sentence for Via.13 By contrast, Via’s co-defendant pled guilty 
and was sentenced by a judge to thirteen years in prison.14 The 
judge declined to modify the jury’s sentence for Via despite 
having received a letter from a juror imploring him to shorten 
it.15 In the letter the juror stated, “I believe the jury may have 
arrived at a different set of verdicts had we more information on 
Virginia’s sentencing requirements and processes.”16  
In a system where juries must recommend a sentence after 
a noncapital jury trial, criminal defendants in Virginia face a 
daunting choice when deciding how to adjudicate their cases: 
should defendants exercise their Sixth Amendment17 right to a 
jury trial, or should defendants waive that right to avoid 
extreme jury sentences? Stories like those of Tucker, Ward, and 
Via serve as stark examples of the potential danger of a jury 
that cannot review the sentencing guidelines. Virginia criminal 
defense law firms and lawyers have highlighted the impact that 
blocking the jury from reviewing sentencing guidelines has on 
 
 11. See id. (outlining the judge’s modification of the jury’s sentence).  
 12. See Ashley Kelly, Hampton Juror Asks Judge to Lower 128-Year 
Prison Sentence, DAILY PRESS (Sept. 19, 2012), https://perma.cc/7B9H-NFYY 
(describing a juror’s request to lower the jury’s recommended sentence and the 
events that led to the trial).   
 13. See id. (explaining that “[t]he jurors sentenced [Via] to the mandatory 
minimum on all counts,” resulting in a 128-year sentence recommendation).  
 14. Id.  
 15. See Peter Dujardin, In Fourth Hampton Jury Trial, Home Invasion 
Defendant Gets 20 Years, DAILY PRESS (Mar. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc
/2WFM-7VT2 (“After the jury gave [Via a 128-year punishment], the jury’s 
foreman wrote to Circuit Judge Christopher W. Hutton, saying jurors would 
have gone lower if they could have. But Hutton declined to suspend any of the 
time, imposing all 128 years.”). The Virginia Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded Via’s first case on grounds unrelated to his sentence. Id. After a 
fourth trial, he received a twenty-year sentence. Id. 
 16. Kelly, supra note 12.  
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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jury sentence recommendations, at times delivering blunt 
warnings to avoid jury trials altogether.18   
This Note argues that Virginia’s mandatory jury sentencing 
scheme, which bars juries from reviewing state sentencing 
guidelines, places an impermissible burden on a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right by unnecessarily encouraging 
defendants to waive jury trials. Data indicates that juries are 
much more likely than a judge to recommend a sentence that is 
more severe than what the sentencing guidelines recommend, 
and judges are hesitant to modify jury sentences.19 Jury ability 
to review the guidelines—a historical record that places the 
defendant within the framework of all similarly situated 
convicted defendants—would not impede the primary goal of 
jury sentencing: allowing a decision maker more in touch with 
the “conscience of the community” to determine an appropriate 
punishment.20 Instead, the guidelines would allow a jury to 
make a more informed recommendation by permitting it to use 
a resource created in response to the abolition of parole and its 
system of good credits. With the guidelines, juries could 
determine sentences in light of the modern system of sentencing 
in Virginia.21  
Part I provides background on Virginia’s mandatory jury 
sentencing scheme and presents data that illustrates why a 
defendant may be hesitant to choose to have a jury trial under 
that system. Jury trials are a somewhat rare phenomenon in 
Virginia now, but when they do take place, juries frequently 
recommend sentences that are longer than what the sentencing 
guidelines would recommend.22 In addition, judges rarely 
modify those recommended sentences.23 Part II identifies the 
 
 18. See, e.g., Jessica Wildeus, What Are Virginia Sentencing Guidelines?, 
TINGEN WILLIAMS (June 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/6FLH-N5UQ (last updated 
June 29, 2020) (“The jury is not bound by the same sentencing guidelines 
Virginia judges must follow. Instead, Virginia juries only need to respect the 
VA Code’s maximum and minimum sentencing statutes. For this reason, in 
most cases Virginia lawyers recommend against requesting a jury trial.”).  
 19. See infra Part I.B.  
 20. See infra Part II.C.  
 21. See infra Part II.D.  
 22. See infra Part I.B.2.  
 23. See infra Part I.B.3.  
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possible legitimate goals of jury sentencing and how, based on 
those purposes, Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme places an 
impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right. 
Part III discusses reforms members of Virginia’s General 
Assembly have proposed and addresses whether the legislation 
would adequately remedy the constitutional issue identified in 
Part II. Part III also contends with the potential impact 
legislative reform will have on Virginia’s criminal justice 
system. The Note concludes by reflecting on the broader 
implications of this Note.   
I. BACKGROUND AND DATA 
This Part outlines Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme and 
then assesses the impact that not allowing juries to review the 
sentencing guidelines has had on jury sentences. Judges, but 
not juries, can consider the guidelines’ recommended ranges 
when they craft an appropriate sentence.24 Has that resulted in 
a significant difference between the sentences that judges and 
juries determine? This Part addresses that question by 
analyzing data from the past twenty-five years.  
A. Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme and Sentencing 
Guidelines 
1. Jury Sentencing in Virginia 
Jury sentencing is not a recent phenomenon: the first 
instance of jury discretion to choose sentences in felony cases in 
the United States appeared in Virginia’s 1796 penal code.25 
Today, Virginia is one of six states that continue to allow a jury 
to recommend a sentence for convicted defendants in noncapital 
 
 24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (describing the 
discretionary nature of the sentencing guidelines for judges but preventing 
any party from presenting information about the guidelines to the jury).  
 25. See Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the 
United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 937 (2003) (describing the early 
imposition of jury sentencing in Virginia and the westward expansion of the 
practice).  
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cases.26 However, only Virginia and Kentucky make jury 
sentences after a jury trial mandatory;27 defendants in the other 
states still have the ability to have only a judge determine their 
sentence after trial.28  
Virginia has a bifurcated jury trial system.29 First, the jury 
determines guilt or innocence.30 If the jury convicts the 
defendant, there is then a sentencing phase where the jury 
hears additional evidence that may otherwise have been 
inadmissible at the guilt phase, including evidence of prior 
convictions.31  
At the sentencing phase, the judge informs the jury of the 
statutory minimum and maximum sentence for each charge.32 
 
 26. The other states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, and 
Texas. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295(A) (“[T]he term of confinement in the 
state correctional facility or in jail and the amount of fine, if any, of a person 
convicted of a criminal offense, shall be ascertained by the jury, or by the court 
in cases tried without a jury.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2020) (outlining 
Arkansas’s jury sentencing scheme); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 
2020) (same for Kentucky); MO. REV. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (2020) (same for 
Missouri); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (West 2020) (same for Oklahoma); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (West 2019) (same for Texas).  
 27. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295(A) (providing that after a defendant is 
convicted of a criminal offense, the punishment “shall be ascertained by the 
jury” (emphasis added)); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (“In the [sentencing] 
hearing the jury will determine the punishment to be imposed within the 
range provided elsewhere by law.”).  
 28. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (“After a jury finds guilt, the 
defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, 
may waive jury sentencing, in which case the court shall impose 
sentence . . . .”); MO. REV. ANN. STAT. § 557.036 (providing that the judge and 
not the jury may assess the proper punishment if the defendant requests it); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 926.1 (“[T]he jury may, and shall upon the request 
of the defendant assess and declare the punishment in their verdict within the 
limitations fixed by law . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) 
(explaining that the judge shall assess the punishment unless the defendant 
requests a jury sentence).  
 29. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (describing Virginia’s bifurcated jury 
trial system). 
 30. See id. (explaining that the first phase of a trial is the guilt phase).  
 31. See id. (outlining the evidence that may be admitted at the separate 
sentencing hearing).  
 32. See Jenia Ioncheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 311, 355 (2003) (“[In Virginia] juries do not have access to sentencing 
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Juries may not review the state’s sentencing guidelines and no 
party may present any information regarding the guidelines to 
the jury.33 Juries also have no ability to recommend whether 
sentences should be suspended or if sentences for multiple 
counts should run consecutively or concurrently.34 Kentucky, 
the only other state that makes jury sentencing mandatory after 
jury trials, allows juries to recommend whether defendants 
should serve sentences for multiple offenses concurrently.35 
The jury’s decision on an appropriate sentence is advisory 
in Virginia, and the judge has the authority to modify it in a 
variety of ways; for example, the judge may decrease the 
sentence, suspend the sentence, or order that a defendant serve 
sentences for multiple counts concurrently.36 When jurors 
recommend sentences for multiple counts, those sentences are 
presented to the judge as sentences to be served consecutively.37 
Unless the judge modifies the jury’s advisory sentence by 
ordering the defendant to serve multiple sentences 
concurrently, the defendant must serve the sentences 
consecutively.38  
 
guidelines or sentencing and probation statistics to help them arrive at a 
verdict consistent with those rendered by other jurors for similar offenses. 
Instead, jurors are provided only with statutory maximums and minimums 
establishing a wide range of permissible sentences.”).  
 33. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (“In cases tried by a jury, 
the jury shall not be presented any information regarding sentencing 
guidelines.”). 
 34. See id.  § 19.2-303 (providing that the court, but not stating that the 
jury, may suspend a sentence or place the defendant on probation).  
 35. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.055 (West 2020) (“The jury shall 
recommend whether the sentences shall be served concurrently or 
consecutively.”).  
 36. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303 (“After conviction, whether with or 
without jury, the court may suspend imposition of sentence or suspend the 
sentence in whole or part and in addition may place the defendant on 
probation under such conditions as the court shall determine . . . .”); id. 
§ 19.2-308 (“When any person is convicted of two or more offenses, and 
sentenced to confinement, such sentences shall not run concurrently, unless 
expressly ordered by the court.”). 
 37. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 38. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
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2. Virginia’s State Sentencing Guidelines 
Virginia’s sentencing guidelines appeared as a result of the 
enactment of truth-in-sentencing laws in the mid-1990s.39 In 
1994, the General Assembly abolished parole, requiring 
convicted felons to serve at least 85 percent of their sentence.40 
The General Assembly also eliminated the system of sentence 
credits awarded to inmates for good behavior.41 Virginia 
established the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission 
(“VCSC”) to develop and administer the guidelines.42  
Upon formation, the VCSC developed a series of 
recommended sentencing ranges for each felony offense that 
reflected the average incarceration time for similarly situated 
offenders before the abolition of parole.43 In many cases, the 
recommended sentencing range falls below the statutory 
minimum sentence for a particular offense because before the 
abolition of parole offenders often served less time than what 
 
 39. See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (“Any person sentenced to a term of 
incarceration for a felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall 
not be eligible for parole upon that offense.”); Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. 
Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. 
REV. 885, 893 (2004) (“Virginia abolished parole and adopted voluntary 
judicial sentencing guidelines in 1995, calibrating the recommended new 
sentence ranges for many offenses so that they replicated actual time served 
under the former parole system.”).  
 40. See 2019 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL 
REPORT 11, [hereinafter 2019 VCSC REPORT], https://perma.cc/D3NT-GA6D 
(PDF) (“Under Virginia’s truth-in-sentencing laws, convicted felons must 
serve at least 85% of the pronounced sentence and they may earn, at most, 
15% off in sentence credits, regardless of whether their sentence is served in 
a state facility or a local jail.”). 
 41. See id. (“Beginning January 1, 1995, the practice of discretionary 
parole release was abolished in Virginia and the existing system of sentence 
credits awarded to inmates for good behavior was eliminated.”).   
 42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (2020) (describing the powers and 
duties of the VCSC).  
 43. See id. § 17.1-805 (providing that the Commission shall establish a 
set of sentencing guidelines and that recommended ranges shall be 
determined by the “actual time-served distribution for similarly situated 
offenders, in terms of their conviction offense and prior criminal history”). 
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the minimum level of punishment required.44 When this 
happens, to remain in compliance with the guidelines 
recommendation, judges must suspend a sentence in whole or in 
part or order that the defendant serve sentences for multiple 
offenses concurrently.45 For example, while the statutory 
minimum for a particular drug offense may be five years, the 
guidelines may recommend a punishment of only one year, 
implying that the judge should suspend all but one year of that 
five-year minimum sentence.46 The recommended sentences are 
“effective time” sentences, which means that the defendant’s 
incarceration time equals the suspended time subtracted from 
the total imposed time.47 Juries cannot recommend a 
punishment below the statutory minimum level, so if the 
guidelines recommend a punishment below the minimum, a 
judge must modify the jury’s sentence.48 
The median time served for a particular offense is the 
midpoint of each recommended sentencing range.49 The 
sentence length recommendation is the midpoint, and it is 
accompanied by a high-end and low-end recommendation.50 
 
 44. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (“Specifically, many drug and 
property offenses carry a statutory minimum term of two or five years, but the 
guidelines ranges for these nonviolent offenses, designed to approximate the 
actual pre-guidelines sentences served, call for much shorter terms.”).  
 45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 46. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (“[P]rior to the abolition of 
parole, a drug offender sentenced to the statutory minimum five years often 
served less than a year.”). 
 47. See ROBINA INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST., JURISDICTION PROFILE: 
VIRGINIA 9 (2020), https://perma.cc/864J-2ZDG (PDF) (explaining the 
difference between effective time and imposed time sentences and that the 
sentencing guidelines recommend effective time sentences).  
 48. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 911 (providing that the judge but 
not the jury has the ability to modify sentences to levels below the statutory 
minimum level).  
 49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805 (2020) (explaining that “[t]he midpoint 
of each initial recommended sentencing range shall be the median time served 
for the middle two quartiles and subject to” a variety of “enhancements” 
unique to each felony offense).  
 50. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 16 (“For cases 
recommended for incarceration of more than six months, the sentence length 
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The VCSC developed and continues to update worksheets 
pertaining to different offenses, including Assault, Drug, Fraud, 
and Murder/Homicide.51 Worksheets use a scoring system to 
determine the appropriate level of punishment, adding points 
for a variety of circumstances present when the crime took 
place.52 For example, the Drug/Other worksheet asks whether 
there are additional offenses, whether a knife or firearm was in 
possession at the time of the offense, whether the defendant has 
any prior convictions, whether the defendant has a prior 
juvenile record, or whether the defendant was on supervised 
probation when the offense took place.53 Midpoints increase 
when the defendant was previously convicted of a violent 
felony.54  
The court must complete sentencing guidelines worksheets 
in all felony cases covered by the guidelines.55 The guidelines 
are discretionary, but when the court departs from the 
recommended range in both jury and non-jury cases, “the court 
shall file with the record of the case a written explanation of 
such departure.”56 These worksheets are sent to the VCSC.57 
Aware that the General Assembly—which elects state 
 
recommendation derived from the guidelines (known as the midpoint) is 
accompanied by a high-end and low-end recommendation.”).  
 51. See Worksheets, VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, https://perma.cc/9DYG-
A8K9 (providing the 2020 sentencing guidelines worksheets).   
 52. See 2020 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION DRUG/OTHER 
WORKSHEET 3–6, https://perma.cc/Q2VS-YYXB (PDF) (outlining the scoring 
system for a drug offense).  
 53. See id. at 3 (giving scores for various factors).  
 54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-805 (detailing how prior convictions and 
violent history impact midpoints for the initial recommended sentencing 
range). 
 55. See id.  § 19.2-298.01 (“In all felony cases, other than Class 1 felonies, 
the court shall (i) have presented to it the appropriate discretionary sentencing 
guidelines worksheets and (ii) review and consider the suitability of the 
applicable discretionary sentencing guidelines . . . .”).   
 56. Id.  
 57. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 2 (“The clerk of the circuit 
court is responsible for sending the completed and signed worksheets to the 
Commission.”).  
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judges58—will know when they depart from the guidelines, 
judges feel pressure to impose guidelines recommendations.59  
B. Data 
1. Percentage of Felony Convictions Adjudicated by Juries 
Studying the breakdown of how felony convictions were 
adjudicated may shed light on how willing or unwilling Virginia 
defendants have been to have a jury determine their sentence. 
A relevant comparison is the difference between the percentage 
of felony convictions resulting from jury trials and those 
resulting from bench trials. A higher percentage of bench trials 
than jury trials may indicate that defendants, while desiring to 
try their cases rather than plead guilty, are more willing to have 
a bench rather than a jury trial, where the judge can use the 
sentencing guidelines to determine a sentence.  
In 2019, jury trials made up just over 1.3 percent of all cases 
in Virginia that resulted in a felony conviction.60 By contrast, 
bench trials made up 9 percent of all cases and guilty pleas made 
up 90 percent.61 The percentage of convictions resulting from a 
jury trial was around 4 percent in the years leading up to 1995—
when the General Assembly implemented the 
truth-in-sentencing reforms62—but has since declined nearly 3 
percentage points, a 75 percent decrease in value.63  
Across Virginia, bench trials make up a larger fraction of 
felony cases that resulted in a conviction than jury trials: in 
 
 58. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“The judges of all other courts of record 
shall be chosen by the vote of the majority of the members elected to each 
house of the General Assembly for terms of eight years.”). 
 59. See King & Noble, supra note 39, at 916 (interviewing a group of 
Virginia judges, one of whom said, “In our state, what the General Assembly 
is looking for is that we stay within the guidelines. When we went to sentence 
guidelines and abolished parole their hope was that there wouldn’t be an 
explosion in the prison population”).  
 60. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27.  
 61. Id.  
 62. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 63. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27. 
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2019 alone, bench trials made up 7.7 percent more of the cases.64 
Perhaps defendants are more inclined to have a legal expert 
decide their cases, but the information disparity in sentencing 
discussed above may also play a role.  
These state statistics mirror a national trend towards more 
guilty pleas and a rapidly diminishing number of jury trials. Of 
all felony convictions at the federal level during the 
twelve-month period ending on June 30, 2019, 97.8 percent 
resulted from guilty pleas, 2.0 percent resulted from jury trials, 
and just 0.2 percent resulted from bench trials.65 In 2018 in 
Texas, a state with optional jury sentencing,66 94 percent of 
felony convictions resulted from guilty pleas, 4 percent resulted 
from bench trials, and 2 percent resulted from jury trials.67  
The starkest difference between Virginia and these other 
jurisdictions is the percentage of felony convictions that result 
from bench trials. In Virginia in 2019, 9 percent of felony 
convictions resulted from bench trials,68 while in Texas in 2018 
the percentage was 4 percent69 and at the federal level it was 
just 0.2 percent.70 The percentage of felony convictions resulting 
from trials—both bench and jury trials—was higher in Virginia 
than these other jurisdictions: 10.3 percent in Virginia,71 6 
percent in Texas,72 and 2.2 percent at the federal level.73 In sum, 
it appears that while Virginia defendants may be more willing 
to have a trial, they are much more eager than defendants in 
Texas or at the federal level to have a bench trial where a judge 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Table D-4—U.S. District Courts—Criminal Statistical Tables for the 
Federal Judiciary (June 30, 2019), U.S. CTS., https://perma.cc/ED7V-Y5JB 
[hereinafter 2019 U.S. District Courts Table] (download data table).  
 66. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 67. 2018 TEX. JUDICIARY ANN. STAT. REP. CT.-LEVEL 21 [hereinafter 2018 
TEXAS REPORT], https://perma.cc/H9B3-FWG4 (PDF).  
 68. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27. 
 69. 2018 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 67, at CT.-LEVEL 21.  
 70. 2019 U.S. District Courts Table, supra note 65.  
 71. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 27. 
 72. 2018 TEXAS REPORT, supra note 67, at 21. 
 73. 2019 U.S. District Courts Table, supra note 65.  
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will determine their sentence instead of a jury trial where a jury 
must recommend a sentence.  
2. Sentencing Guidelines Compliance 
Based on stories about individual cases alone, criminal 
defense lawyers in Virginia are aware of the inherent risk of 
going to a jury trial under mandatory jury sentencing—if 
convicted, juries must recommend a sentence with no ability to 
review the sentencing guidelines, and juries frequently deviate 
from what guidelines recommend.74 But how often do juries 
really deviate from the guidelines? Is deviation limited to 
extreme cases like those of Tucker, Ward, and Via,75 or is it 
much more widespread? This section seeks to answer those 
questions by comparing the rates at which judges and juries 
comply with the guidelines and how often they recommend 
sentences that are harsher or less severe than guideline 
recommendations.  
The VCSC releases an annual report that includes a 
breakdown of “Guidelines Concurrence,” defined as “judicial 
agreement with the sentencing guidelines . . . .”76 The 
Commission reviews all guidelines worksheets and analyzes 
them to determine judicial compliance with the guidelines.77 
The extent to which the decision maker agrees with the 
guidelines recommended ranges is the “concurrence” or 
“compliance” rate.78 The “aggravation rate” is the rate at which 
the decision maker sentences defendants “to sanctions more 
severe than the guidelines recommendation . . . .”79 For the 
 
 74. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.  
 75. See supra INTRODUCTION.  
 76. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 12.  
 77. See id. at 2 (describing the process by which courts complete and 
submit worksheets and the Commission’s analysis of those worksheets for 
completeness and concurrence).  
 78. See id. at 14 (“The overall concurrence rate summarizes the extent to 
which Virginia’s judges concur with recommendations provided by the 
sentencing guidelines, both in type of disposition and in length of 
incarceration.”).  
 79. Id.  
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purpose of remaining consistent with the VCSC’s own 
terminology, this Note will refer to the rate of “upward 
departures” from guideline recommendations as the 
“aggravation rate.” They are, however, the same concept. 
Finally, the “mitigation rate” is “the rate at which [the decision 
maker] sentences offenders to sanctions less severe than the 
guidelines recommendation . . . .”80 This Note will refer to the 
rate of “downward departures” from guideline recommendations 
as the “mitigation rate” in order to remain consistent with 
Commission terminology.  
The Commission has tracked and published these rates in 
its annual reports for every type of criminal adjudication—
guilty plea, bench trial, and jury trial—since its establishment 
in 1995.81  
 
Table 1: Average Guidelines Concurrence 1995–201982 







Mitigation Rate  10.5% 11.6% 
 
In 2019, judges accepted guideline recommendations in 
83.9 percent of cases.83 The aggravation rate was 7.4 percent, 
and the mitigation rate was 8.7 percent.84 This compliance rate 
reflects the trend that the judge compliance rate has gradually 
increased from the inception of the guidelines to now: in 1995, 
judge compliance was 75 percent, the aggravation rate was 14.5 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. See infra Appendix 1 (listing the compliance, aggravation, and 
mitigation rates for judges and juries from 1995–2019 as listed in the VCSC’s 
annual reports).  
 82. Id.  
 83. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.  
 84. Id.  
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percent, and the mitigation rate was 10.5 percent.85 The average 
judge compliance rate between 1995 and 2019 was 79.6 percent, 
the average aggravation rate was 9.9 percent, and the average 
mitigation rate was 10.5 percent.86 
Juries on the other hand complied with guideline 
recommendations only 49.7 percent of the time in 2019, 
unwittingly deviating from the guidelines far more often than 
judges.87 The aggravation rate, 36.7 percent, was over four times 
higher than the 2019 judge aggravation rate (7.4 percent).88 
However, the mitigation rate, 13.6 percent, was much closer to 
the judge mitigation rate (8.7 percent).89 When deviating from 
guideline recommendations, juries were therefore much more 
likely to return a more severe sentence than what the guidelines 
would recommend than they were to return a less severe 
sentence.  
Deprived of any information relating to the guidelines, 
juries have unsurprisingly shown no general trend towards 
complying with them since 1995.90 In 1995, the jury compliance 
rate was 49.2 percent,91 which was higher than any year except 
2019, when it was 49.7 percent.92 Between 1995 and 2019, the 
jury compliance rate oscillated from year to year; for example, 
in 2014, the compliance rate was 32.2 percent,93 but just one 
 
 85. 1995 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORTED 
41 [hereinafter 1995 VCSC REPORT], https://perma.cc/GF6A-A4DA (PDF).  
 86. See infra Appendix 1 (averaging the twenty-five years of compliance, 
aggravation, and mitigation rates that the Commission has provided in its 
annual reports since 1995).  
 87. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. See infra Appendix 1. 
 91. 1995 VCSC REPORT, supra note 85, at 56.  
 92. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1 
(providing jury compliance rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the 
VCSC). 
 93. 2014 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 35, 
https://perma.cc/W94M-PQFC (PDF). 
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year later in 2015 it increased to 43.3 percent,94 and by 2018 the 




The average jury compliance rate from 1995–2019 was 41.8 
percent, the average aggravation rate was 46.6 percent, and the 
average mitigation rate was 11.6 percent.97 Figure 1 
demonstrates that the compliance and aggravation rates were 
somewhat unpredictable during this period.98 In 2019, the 
compliance rate was 49.7 percent and the aggravation rate was 
36.7 percent,99 while in 2001 the compliance rate was 30.4 
percent and the aggravation rate was 56.2 percent.100 The 2001 
rates reflected the general trend where the aggravation rate was 
 
 94. 2015 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 37, 
https://perma.cc/7MVK-GB9B (PDF). 
 95. 2018 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 27, 
https://perma.cc/MM3U-CPU7 (PDF). 
 96. See infra Appendix 1 (listing jury compliance, aggravation, and 
mitigation rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the VCSC).  
 97. See id. (averaging the jury compliance, aggravation, and mitigation 
rates from 1995 until 2019 as reported by the VCSC).  
 98. See supra Figure 1.  
 99. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29. 
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higher than the compliance rate—in twenty out of the 
twenty-five years since truth-in-sentencing began, the jury 
aggravation rate was higher than the compliance rate.101  
In sum, in any given year, a jury is more likely than a judge 
to recommend a sentence that is more severe than what the 
guidelines recommend.102 Furthermore, judges are more likely 
than a jury to comply with the guidelines, while there is a 
roughly equal chance that a judge or jury will impose a sentence 
that is less severe than what the guidelines would 
recommend.103   
3. Judge Modifications of Jury Sentences 
Jury sentences are recommendations: judges may choose to 
impose the sentence as recommended, but they also have the 
power to modify the recommendations by choosing, among other 
things, to suspend the sentence in whole or in part or by 
choosing to order that the defendant serve sentences for 
multiple offenses concurrently.104 Should defendants, aware 
that juries are much more likely to recommend sentences that 
are harsher than guideline ranges, feel comforted by the judge’s 
power to modify a jury’s sentence and feel more confident about 
choosing to have a jury trial? Do judges routinely respond to 
harsh jury sentences by bringing them back into compliance 
with the guidelines?  
Judges rarely modify jury sentences. In 2019, judges 
modified just 9 percent of jury sentences.105 The VCSC has only 
tracked the exact percentage of jury sentences modified by a 
judge since 2004, but the average percentage of jury sentences 
that judges modified from 2004–2019 was 18.9 percent.106  
 
 101. See infra Appendix 1 (providing the jury compliance and aggravation 
rates from 1995–2019 as reported by the VCSC).  
 102. See supra Table 1.  
 103. See supra Table 1.  
 104. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 105. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.  
 106. See infra Appendix 1 (listing and averaging the judge modification of 
jury sentence rates from 2004–2019 as reported by the VCSC).  
 
538 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519 (2021) 
 
At 9 percent, the percentage of jury sentences that judges 
modified in 2019 is fairly low relative to the average 
modification rate of 18.9 percent.107 In addition, as noted 
above,108 the jury’s 49.7 percent compliance rate in 2019 was, 
relative to other years, fairly high and the 36.7 percent 
aggravation rate was relatively low.109 This juxtaposition of a 
high jury compliance rate, a low aggravation rate, and a low 
judge modification rate raises the question of whether there is a 
relationship between judge modification of jury sentences and 
aggravation rates. Put another way, are judge modification 
rates higher when aggravation rates are also higher, suggesting 
that judges respond to more severe punishments by making 
them less severe?110 
Figure 2 
 
The correlation coefficient between aggravation rates since 
2004 and judge modification rates since 2004 is 0.39, which 
suggests a moderately weak to moderately positive relationship 
 
 107. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1.  
 108. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.  
 109. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29; see infra Appendix 1.  
 110. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29 (explaining that judges 
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between the two variables.111 This means that as aggravation 
rates go up, judge modification rates are moderately likely to go 
up as well. However, excluding 2019’s aggravation and judge 
modification rates, the correlation coefficient is 0.10, which 
suggests a much weaker relationship between the two variables, 
meaning that aggravation rates have little to no impact on judge 
modification rates overall.112 This impact on the overall 
correlation coefficient in addition to Figure 2 indicate that the 
2019 judge modification rate may be an outlier.113  
In any case, with only fifteen years of data, this data set is 
small, and it is difficult at this early stage to definitively 
determine a relationship between these two variables. In 
addition, any number of factors could explain a judge’s decision 
to modify a jury’s sentence,114 so it is not possible to conclusively 
state that there is a weak probability that a judge will modify a 
jury’s sentence if it is much more severe than what the 
guidelines would recommend. However, these low correlation 
coefficients in addition to the individual cases discussed in Part 
I demonstrate that one cannot also conclude that judges are 
strongly likely to modify a jury’s sentence if it goes above the 
recommended sentence.115 
4. Data Takeaways 
As in many jurisdictions, the percentage of convictions 
adjudicated by jury trial rapidly declined in Virginia over the 
 
 111. See infra Appendix 1 (providing the judge modification rates and jury 
aggravation rates from 2004–2019 and calculating the correlation between the 
two variables); Haldun Akoglu, User’s Guide to Correlation Coefficients, 18 
TURKISH J. MED. 91, 91–93 (2018), https://perma.cc/7CXL-4Q4Z (PDF) 
(discussing what different correlation coefficient values mean).  
 112. See infra Appendix 1. 
 113. See 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29 (listing a judge 
modification rate of nine percent). 
 114. See id. at 17 (providing the most common reasons judges departed 
from the guidelines, including “defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement” 
as a reason to sentence below the guidelines, and “the severity or degree of 
prior record” as a reason to sentence above the guidelines). 
 115. See supra INTRODUCTION.  
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past twenty-five years.116 However, relative to Texas—a state 
with optional jury sentencing117—and federal courts, the 
percentage of convictions adjudicated by bench trials is much 
higher in Virginia.118 The significant chance that a jury could 
recommend a sentence above the sentencing guidelines 
recommended range and the relatively safe assumption that a 
judge would impose the sentencing guidelines recommendation 
may be driving this trend.119 This disparity between jury and 
judge sentences, in conjunction with the reality that judges 
usually avoid modifying jury sentences,120 serves as a strong 
incentive for a defendant in Virginia to waive his or her right to 
a jury trial. 
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON 
IMPERMISSIBLE BURDENS ON A DEFENDANT’S SIXTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT AND VIRGINIA JURY SENTENCING 
Under a mandatory jury sentencing scheme in Virginia, a 
jury is much more likely than a judge to recommend a sentence 
that is more severe than what the sentencing guidelines 
recommend, while judges are more inclined to impose what the 
guidelines recommend.121 Does Virginia’s jury sentencing 
scheme place an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right by forcing him to choose between a decision 
maker that can review the sentencing guidelines and one that 
cannot? This Part analyzes that question as it relates to 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on impermissible burdens on 
constitutional rights and retaliation.  
 
 116. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 117. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 118. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 119. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 120. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 121. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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A. United States v. Jackson and Needless Encouragements of 
Guilty Pleas and Jury Waivers 
Soon after the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee to a right to a jury trial to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,122 the Court addressed 
several state and federal statutory schemes to determine 
whether the scheme structures impermissibly burdened a 
defendant’s right to a jury trial.123  
In United States v. Jackson,124 the Court struck down a 
provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act125 that only allowed 
juries to impose the death penalty for a violation of the Act.126 
In making this determination, the Court referenced Congress’s 
purpose in structuring the statute this way: Congress aimed to 
make it possible only for a jury, not a judge, to impose the death 
penalty.127 While the Court noted that this was a “legitimate” 
goal, the Court also found that the “goal can be achieved without 
penalizing those defendants who plead not guilty and demand 
jury trial.”128 For example, Congress could allow the jury to 
choose between life imprisonment and the death penalty in 
every case, including after guilty pleas.129 As a result, the Court 
 
 122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because we 
believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right 
of jury trial in all criminal cases which . . . would come within the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee.”).  
 123. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 570–71 (1968) (analyzing 
the Federal Kidnapping Act); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 214–16 
(1978) (addressing New Jersey’s homicide statutes).  
 124. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
 125. Pub. L. No. 72-189, 47 Stat. 326 (1932) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1201). 
 126. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591.  
 127. Id. at 582.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See id. (“In some States, for example, the choice between life 
imprisonment and capital punishment is left to a jury in every case—
regardless of how the defendant’s guilt has been determined.”).   
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found that the death penalty clause of the Act was 
unenforceable.130  
The Court elaborated that “the evil in the federal statute is 
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but 
simply that it needlessly encourages them.”131 Procedures do not 
need to be “inherently coercive” to meet this threshold.132 Some 
guilty pleas may still be voluntary under a statutory scheme 
that imposes an impermissible burden on a defendant’s 
constitutional right.133 The critical inquiry is whether, 
referencing the legitimate purpose in structuring the statutory 
system, the statutory scheme “needlessly” encourages guilty 
pleas and jury waivers.134 If there are alternative ways to 
achieve that legitimate purpose without encouraging guilty 
pleas and jury waivers, then the particular procedure imposes 
an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right.135  
Professor Loftus Becker construed Jackson as creating a 
two-part inquiry.136 First, does the statutory system have any 
legitimate purpose, other than chilling the constitutional rights 
of those who assert them?137 Failing to assert a legitimate 
purpose results in a per se impermissible burden on a 
 
 130. See id. at 582–83 (finding that because there were alternative ways 
to limit “the death penalty to cases in which a jury recommends it,” the death 
penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act could not “be justified by its 
ostensible purpose”).  
 131. Id. at 583 (emphasis added).  
 132. Id.  
 133. See id. (finding that the death penalty provision’s tendency to 
encourage defendants to waive jury trial does not mean every guilty plea is 
involuntary). 
 134. See id. at 582 (“The question is not whether the chilling effect is 
‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the question is whether the effect is 
unnecessary and therefore excessive.”).   
 135. See id. at 582–83 (finding that, after identifying alternative ways to 
limit the imposition of the death penalty, “Congress cannot impose such a 
penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional 
right”).  
 136. Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 793 (1988).  
 137. Id.  
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constitutional right.138 In Jackson, the Court found that the 
government’s goal of limiting the imposition of the death 
penalty to cases where the jury recommends it was legitimate.139  
Second, are the particular characteristics of the system 
necessary to implement the legitimate purposes served?140 The 
Jackson Court found that the death penalty clause failed to pass 
this test; the government could find other ways to limit the 
imposition of the death penalty to cases in which a jury 
recommends it without burdening a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial.141  
This Note argues that Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme, by 
not allowing the jury to review the sentencing guidelines, fails 
Jackson’s two-part test. First, Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme 
may serve a legitimate purpose.142 For example, the jury may be 
the more appropriate decision maker, as the conscience of the 
community, to determine the appropriate level of punishment. 
However, blocking the jury’s access to the sentencing 
guidelines—a record of how decision makers have sentenced 
similarly situated defendants in the past—is not necessary to 
implement jury sentencing’s legitimate purposes, and it 
needlessly encourages Virginia defendants to waive their right 
to a jury trial.143  
B. The Current Status of Jackson 
Before fully analyzing Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme, 
however, this Note must address how subsequent Supreme 
 
 138. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968) (“If the 
provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of 
constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it 
would be patently unconstitutional.”).  
 139. See id. at 582 (“The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in 
which a jury recommends it is an entirely legitimate one.”).  
 140. Becker, supra note 136, at 793.  
 141. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582 (discussing alternative ways to only 
allow a jury to impose the death penalty, including leaving “the choice between 
life imprisonment and capital punishment” to a jury in every case, “regardless 
of how the defendant’s guilt has been determined”).  
 142. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 143. See infra Part II.C.2. 
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Court cases have impacted the scope of Jackson and the test 
identified by Professor Becker.  
1. Clarifying Then Narrowing the Scope of Jackson 
Two years after Jackson, the Supreme Court held in Brady 
v. United States144 that a defendant’s guilty plea—after he was 
charged under the same Federal Kidnapping Act before Jackson 
was decided—was not involuntary.145 The Court in Jackson had 
explicitly stated that not all guilty pleas under a statutory 
scheme that imposes an impermissible burden on a defendant’s 
constitutional rights are involuntary.146 Accordingly, the Court 
in Brady found that Jackson did not fashion “a new standard for 
judging the validity of guilty pleas” and that guilty pleas are not 
necessarily compelled or invalid when the defendant wants to 
accept a lesser penalty rather than risk receiving a harsher one 
at trial.147 The Court left untouched the two-pronged approach 
that identifies (1) the legitimate purpose a statutory system 
serves and (2) whether the characteristics of that system are 
necessary to achieve that purpose.148  
The scope of Jackson became less clear after Corbitt v. New 
Jersey.149 In Corbitt, the Court reviewed the New Jersey 
homicide statutes, which provided that defendants convicted of 
first-degree murder by a jury were subject to mandatory life 
imprisonment, while defendants that pled guilty received either 
 
 144. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).  
 145. See id. at 752 (“We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is 
compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever motivated by the 
defendant’s desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty 
rather than face a wider range of possibilities . . . .”).  
 146. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583 (“Thus the fact that the Federal 
Kidnaping Act tends to discourage defendants from insisting upon their 
innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that every defendant 
who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so involuntarily.”). 
 147. Brady, 397 U.S. at 747.   
 148. See id. at 745–48 (summarizing the Court’s holding in Jackson that 
relied on identifying the legitimate goal of limiting the imposition of the death 
penalty and the unnecessary way Congress chose to achieve that goal).   
 149. 439 U.S. 212 (1978).  
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life imprisonment or a lesser sentence.150 The Court 
distinguished Jackson, noting that pleading guilty to homicide 
did not guarantee a lower sentence than if the defendant had 
requested a jury trial: a judge could still impose a life 
sentence.151 By contrast, a defendant charged under the Federal 
Kidnapping Act in Jackson could no longer receive the death 
penalty if she pled guilty.152  
The Court, addressing Jackson, found that “not every 
burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every 
pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”153 
The chance that a defendant would receive a more lenient 
sentence by waiving a jury trial did not invalidate the 
defendant’s guilty plea.154 Such a scheme furthers a state’s 
interest in encouraging guilty pleas, creating a system that 
benefits both the state and defendants.155  
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, in essence argued 
that the statutory scheme in Corbitt failed the first prong of 
Jackson’s test identified by Professor Becker—the scheme 
served no other purpose than to penalize the defendant’s right 
to plead not guilty.156 New Jersey provided no legitimate 
purpose for the characteristics of the homicide statutes other 
 
 150. Id. at 214–16.  
 151. Id. at 217–18.  
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 218.  
 154. See id. at 221 (“In Bordenkircher, the probability or certainty of 
leniency in return for a plea did not invalidate the mandatory penalty imposed 
after a jury trial.”).  
 155. See id. at 222 (finding that the “State’s legitimate interest in 
encouraging the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining” is “a 
process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the State”).  
 156. See id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A] statute that has no other 
purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty is 
‘patently unconstitutional.’ The Court so held in [Jackson], and that holding 
is dispositive of this case.” (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 
581 (1968))).  
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than to encourage guilty pleas to conserve prosecutorial 
resources.157  
Justice Stevens noted that under this particular scheme, 
the defendant faced a harsher potential penalty if he demanded 
a jury trial: he would receive a mandatory life sentence if found 
guilty, while if he pled guilty the judge may impose a life 
sentence or even no sentence at all.158 The effect of this system—
one that included a more severe range of statutory penalties 
after a jury trial—was that a defendant found guilty after a jury 
trial was punished not only for the conduct in committing the 
offense but also for the “offense” of entering a “false” not-guilty 
plea.159  
Because New Jersey failed to enunciate any purpose for its 
homicide statutory system other than to encourage defendants 
to plead guilty, Justice Stevens did not address whether the 
particular characteristics of the statutory system were 
necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.160 While Justice 
Stevens noted that the majority did not overrule Jackson, he 
lamented that the majority divorced Jackson “from the rationale 
on which it rested.”161  
2. Modern Application of Jackson 
After Corbitt, the question is: what is left of Jackson?  
 
 157. See id. (“New Jersey does not seriously contend that [the homicide 
statute] has any purpose or effect other than to penalize the assertion of the 
right not to plead guilty.”).  
 158. Id. at 230–31.  
 159. Id. at 232; see Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea 
Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 
58 (“In some cases, the unconscionable nature of the plea bargaining process 
induces defendants who would otherwise be acquitted at trial to plead 
guilty.”).   
 160. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 229 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Jackson’s holding that “a statute that has no other 
purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the right not to plead guilty is 
‘patently unconstitutional’” was dispositive of this case).  
 161. Id.  
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a. Reconciling Jackson and Corbitt 
The strictest reading of Corbitt would essentially overrule 
Jackson. By failing to articulate a legitimate purpose for the 
statutory scheme at issue, the Court in Corbitt did not use the 
same type of analysis to determine whether a statutory scheme 
had placed an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights.162 Instead, the Court solely focused on 
a state’s interest in encouraging guilty pleas to save 
prosecutorial costs.163  
However, while the Court did not use the same analysis laid 
out in Jackson, the Court did not explicitly overrule Jackson.164 
The Court distinguished Jackson, finding that Corbitt’s case did 
not involve the death penalty and the statutory scheme at issue 
did not allow the defendant to escape the maximum possible 
punishment by pleading guilty.165 Under a narrow reading of 
both Jackson and Corbitt, two factors must be present for 
Jackson to be relevant and binding. First, the statutory scheme 
must include the death penalty as a potential punishment.166 
 
 162. See id. (arguing that Jackson mandates that states must establish a 
purpose for a statute other than simply encouraging defendants to plead 
guilty).  
 163. See id. at 218–19 (majority opinion) (“Specifically, there is no per se 
rule against encouraging guilty pleas. We have squarely held that a State may 
encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the 
plea.”).   
 164. Cf. id. at 217 (“[T]here are substantial differences between this case 
and Jackson, and . . . Jackson does not require a reversal of Corbitt’s 
conviction.”).  
 165. See id. (distinguishing Jackson on the grounds that “[f]irst, the death 
penalty, which is ‘unique in its severity and irrevocability,’ . . . is not involved 
here” and second, while the defendant in Jackson could avoid the maximum 
penalty by pleading guilty, the defendant in Corbitt could not).  
 166. See id. (noting that the death penalty, which is “unique in its severity 
and irrevocability,” was present in the Federal Kidnapping Act, but it was not 
in the New Jersey statutory scheme). But see id. (articulating that the Court 
“need not agree with the New Jersey court that the Jackson rationale is 
limited to those cases where a plea avoids any possibility of the death penalty’s 
being imposed” but that the absence of the death penalty “is a material fact”).  
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Second, the defendant must be able to avoid a harsher 
punishment by waiving a jury trial.167  
The underlying rationale of Jackson, however, went beyond 
these two factors alone—Justice Stevens noted that Jackson’s 
rationale required courts to identify a legitimate purpose for the 
statutory system that allegedly encouraged guilty pleas and 
jury waivers; any system that did so with no other purpose than 
to chill a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights was 
“patently unconstitutional.”168  
b. Jackson as a Retaliation Case 
More recently in Wilkie v. Robbins,169 the Court cited 
Jackson as an example of a retaliation case to illustrate the 
Court’s “longstanding recognition that the Government may not 
retaliate for exercising First Amendment speech rights . . . or 
certain others of constitutional rank.”170 According to the Court, 
retaliation cases “turn on an allegation of impermissible 
purpose and motivation . . . .”171  
In Jackson, the Government had a legitimate purpose when 
it only allowed a jury to impose the death penalty: it wanted to 
limit the imposition of the death penalty to cases where the jury 
recommended it.172 But that purpose was “impermissible” under 
that particular statutory scheme.173 Because the legitimate 
 
 167. See id. (“[I]n Jackson, any risk of suffering the maximum penalty 
could be avoided by pleading guilty. Here . . . the risk of [life imprisonment] is 
not completely avoided by pleading non vult because the judge accepting the 
plea has the authority to impose a life term.”).  
 168. See id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Jackson held that 
“a statute that has no other purpose or effect than to penalize assertion of the 
right not to plead guilty is ‘patently unconstitutional’” and that the entry of a 
guilty plea “cannot at once be criminally punishable and constitutionally 
protected”).  
 169. 551 U.S. 537 (2007).  
 170. Id. at 555–56.  
 171. Id. at 556.  
 172. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 (1968) (“The goal of 
limiting the death penalty to cases [in] which a jury recommends it is an 
entirely legitimate one.”).  
 173. Id. at 572.  
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purpose could be achieved in a way that did not needlessly 
encourage defendants to waive jury trials or plead guilty, the 
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act 
amounted to retaliation and was accordingly 
unconstitutional.174   
This Note argues that Jackson remains apposite in cases 
where there is an impermissible purpose or motivation 
underlying the statutory system at issue. Such an 
impermissible purpose or motivation is present when statutory 
schemes needlessly encourage guilty pleas and jury waivers.175 
With no necessary link to a legitimate purpose, a particular 
characteristic of a statutory scheme that encourages guilty 
pleas or jury waivers rises to the level of retaliation and is 
accordingly invalid.176  
A court honoring Corbitt may point out that New Jersey and 
other states may structure their criminal statutes in ways that 
encourage defendants to plead guilty and waive a jury trial to 
receive a more lenient sentence.177 New Jersey’s homicide 
statute was not a form of “retaliation” because the state 
legislature operated within permissible bounds to induce 
defendants into pleading guilty.178  
But this runs in tension with the Court’s earlier 
announcement that actions where the “legislature, prosecutor, 
 
 174. See id. at 582 (“Whatever the power of Congress to impose a death 
penalty for violation of the Federal Kidnaping Act, Congress cannot impose 
such a penalty in a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a 
constitutional right.”).  
 175. See id. (“Whatever might be said of Congress’ objectives, they cannot 
be pursued by means that needlessly chill the exercise of basic constitutional 
rights.”).  
 176. See id. (finding that while Congress’ goal to limit the imposition of the 
death penalty was legitimate, the method it chose to do so was invalid because 
there were alternative ways to achieve the goal without encouraging guilty 
pleas and jury waivers). 
 177. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 220 (1978) (reiterating that 
deciding to avoid a potentially harsher punishment is a difficult choice that is 
an inevitable and permissible aspect of a legitimate system that encourages 
the negotiation of pleas).  
 178. See id. at 219 (“We have squarely held that a State may encourage a 
guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.”).  
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judge, or all three ‘deliberately employ their charging and 
sentencing powers to induce [a] defendant to tender a plea of 
guilty,’ and where they do so with the ‘objective [of] penaliz[ing] 
a person’s reliance on his legal rights, [are] ‘patently 
unconstitutional.’”179 Plea negotiations play an important role 
in providing the defendant with options—and at times 
leverage—in the pretrial phase.180 But a statutory system that 
needlessly encourages defendants to waive their constitutional 
rights is still invalid.181  
Jackson was a retaliation case because, prior to any plea 
negotiations, the defendant needlessly faced a much harsher 
penalty if he asserted his right to a jury trial.182 Congress, in 
limiting the death penalty to those defendants that asserted 
their constitutional right, “deliberately employ[ed] [its] 
charging and sentencing powers to induce [a] defendant to 
tender a plea of guilty.”183 That impermissible congressional 
purpose was evidence of retaliation in Jackson, which the Court 
confirmed in Wilkie.184  
C. Is Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme a Form of 
Retaliation? 
Data demonstrating a jury’s tendency to recommend a 
sentence that is harsher than what the guidelines and judges 
would recommend in addition to the low probability that a judge 
will modify a severe jury sentence indicates that defendants 
have a strong incentive to waive their Sixth Amendment right 
 
 179. Id. at 232 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brady v. United 
States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 n.8 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
363 (1978)).  
 180. See id. at 222 (majority opinion) (describing the plea bargaining 
process as a “process mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the State”).  
 181. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 583 (“For the evil in the federal statute is 
not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it 
needlessly encourages them.”).  
 182. See id. (“Congress cannot impose such a penalty in a manner that 
needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right.”).  
 183. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 (1970).  
 184. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 556 (2007) (“Those [retaliation] 
cases turn on an allegation of impermissible purpose and motivation.”).  
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under mandatory jury sentencing.185 The question, however, is 
whether Virginia’s statutory scheme for jury sentencing places 
an impermissible burden on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.  
Answering this question requires analyzing whether the 
statutory scheme reveals an impermissible purpose or 
motivation on the part of the Virginia General Assembly in 
burdening a defendant’s constitutional rights.186 This calls for 
identifying a purpose behind the statutory scheme, determining 
whether that purpose goes beyond simply encouraging 
defendants to waive their right to a jury trial, and, if there is a 
legitimate purpose, concluding whether the particular 
characteristics of the system are necessary to implement that 
purpose.187  
This Note argues that jury sentencing serves a legitimate 
purpose beyond simply encouraging defendants to waive their 
right to a jury trial. Jury sentencing places the decision-making 
power in the hands of a non-governmental body that more 
accurately represents the “conscience of the community.”188 The 
jury also has a long history in the Anglo-American legal 
tradition as a bulwark against oppression by the government.189  
However, by making jury sentencing mandatory after a jury 
trial and by not allowing the jury to use the sentencing 
guidelines, the General Assembly created a system where 
judge-created sentences and jury-recommended sentences 
 
 185. See supra Part I.B. 
 186. See Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 556 (finding that all retaliation cases exhibit 
impermissible motivations and purposes).  
 187. See Becker, supra note 136, at 793 (defining a two-prong test from 
Jackson).   
 188. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 615–16 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (discussing how, with regards to retribution, the jury more 
accurately reflects the “composition and experiences of the community as a 
whole,” and as a result is more likely to “express the conscience of the 
community”).   
 189. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees 
of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment 
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered. A 
right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent 
oppression by the Government.”).  
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dramatically diverge.190 Limiting the jury’s ability to use the 
guidelines and to make further recommendations to modify 
sentences has no connection to jury sentencing’s legitimate 
purposes, so the General Assembly’s scheme needlessly 
encourages jury trial waivers.  
1. Legitimate Purposes of Jury Sentencing in Virginia 
As mentioned, the focus of the two-part inquiry of jury 
sentencing in Virginia will focus on the jury’s particular 
inability to review the sentencing guidelines and to recommend 
additional modifications to sentences. However, answering the 
first part of the inquiry from Jackson—whether a statutory 
scheme has any legitimate purpose other than chilling the Sixth 
Amendment right of those who assert it—requires looking at the 
broader purposes of jury sentencing.191  
Jury sentencing in noncapital cases, though currently only 
in force in six states, has a long history in the Anglo-American 
legal tradition.192 Nonetheless, by the end of the twentieth 
century, scholarly opposition to jury sentencing in noncapital 
cases was “nearly unanimous” and it came to be seen as “an 
outdated remnant of the postcolonial period.”193 A resurgence of 
support for jury sentencing in noncapital cases began in the late 
1990s.  
In the scholarly community, academics began to 
understand the possible benefits of limiting a judge’s power in 
the sentencing process. Adriaan Lanni in 1999 wrote a student 
Note that was potentially the first academic paper supporting 
jury sentencing in noncapital cases since 1918.194 In response to 
 
 190. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 191. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.   
 192. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 316 (“This history reveals that jury 
sentencing—a uniquely American innovation—was a valued democratic 
institution in the early republic, but was gradually abandoned in the twentieth 
century as scientific approaches to punishment came into favor.”).  
 193. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775, 1788 (1999).   
 194. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 
951, 951 (2003) (“I want to thank Adriaan Lanni, whose Note in the Yale Law 
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the shift towards giving sentencing authority to “inexperienced 
legislators” and judges subject to political pressure, Lanni 
argued that jury sentencing is the “most direct and least 
distorting mechanism to conform criminal sanctions to 
community sentiment.”195  
Practitioners and academics followed her lead at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century in calling for a return to 
jury sentencing in noncapital cases. According to jury 
sentencing’s supporters, juries are the best decision makers to 
deliver a sentence because they embody the conscience of the 
community and they act as bulwarks against oppressive 
government power.196  
A line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Apprendi v. 
New Jersey197 provided jury sentencing’s supporters with 
another argument in favor of jury sentencing: jury sentencing 
ostensibly forecloses confusion about whether judges are able to 
determine a particular sentencing factor or if that factor is a 
sentence enhancer that a jury must find beyond a reasonable 
doubt.198 In Apprendi, the Court held that “any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”199 Apprendi and the cases that 
followed created uncertainty about the difference between 
elements that require jury determinations and sentencing 
 
Journal in 1999 was the first article in eighty-one years to call for a return to 
jury sentencing.”).  
 195. Lanni, supra note 193, at 1802.  
 196. See Hoffman, supra note 194, at 951 (arguing that jurors are the “best 
arbiters” of the “moral inquiry” of retribution); Bertrall L. Ross, Reconciling 
the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth Amendment in a Real Offense 
Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 725, 725 (2006) 
(discussing how the jury was “once noted as the ‘bulwark’ of our liberties and 
protector against oppressive government power”). 
 197. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
 198. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 314 (“This Article will argue that 
legislatures should clear this jurisprudential thicket and take the final logical 
step suggested by the Apprendi line of decisions: reintroduction of jury 
sentencing.”).  
 199. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  
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factors that judges may determine.200 Sending the entire 
sentencing determination to a jury avoids this confusion 
altogether.   
Jury sentencing therefore does more than just encourage a 
defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial. Potential 
legitimate purposes include but are not limited to the jury’s 
ability to conform punishments to community sentiment and to 
serve as a bulwark against government oppression, as well as 
avoiding confusion about whether a judge or a jury should 
determine a sentencing factor.  
2. Are the Particular Characteristics of Virginia’s Jury 
Sentencing Scheme Necessary to Implement its Legitimate 
Purposes? 
The next part of the inquiry focuses on whether particular 
characteristics of a statutory scheme that tends to encourage 
guilty pleas and jury trial waivers are necessary to implement 
its legitimate purposes.201 The particular characteristic at issue 
here is the jury’s inability to review Virginia sentencing 
guidelines worksheets—a capability that judges already 
have.202  
This Note focuses on two legitimate purposes of jury 
sentencing: (1) giving more authority to the “conscience of the 
community,” and (2) preventing government oppression.203 
a. The Conscience of the Community 
In the criminal justice system, juries represent a cross 
section of the community and in theory serve as that 
 
 200. See Hoffman, supra note 194, at 982 (“[T]here seems to be no 
principled basis upon which to truly distinguish elements from sentencing 
factors.”).  
 201. See supra notes 136–141 and accompanying text.  
 202. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 203. This Note will not focus on jury sentencing’s ability to solve the 
“jurisprudential problems” presented by Apprendi. This Note discusses 
Apprendi solely to provide background on the resurgence in support for jury 
sentencing in the early twentieth century.   
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community’s “conscience.”204 In the late twentieth century, 
retribution gradually replaced rehabilitation as the main goal of 
sentencing, and juries are hypothetically the better decision 
maker to determine a sentence in line with the community’s 
standards for retribution.205  
One possible reason behind not allowing juries to review 
guidelines worksheets may be to enable the jury to deliver a 
sentence fully in line with the community’s standard for 
retribution. Reviewing guidelines worksheets may only confuse 
the jury and distract it from its main task, and the only person 
who should interact with this more administrative aspect of the 
sentencing process is the judge, a legal expert.  
On the other hand, providing this tool to the jury may 
support the jury’s role as the community’s representative by 
giving it a clear picture of how sentencing works today. Even 
some of jury sentencing’s supporters recognize the need for the 
jury to have access to the guidelines.206 The guidelines provide 
judges with a snapshot of how decision makers have sentenced 
all other defendants guilty of similar types and numbers of 
offenses as well as how the decision maker factored in such 
characteristics as prior criminal history.207 The guidelines came 
into being to fill the void that the abolition of parole and the 
system of good credits created.208 They are discretionary; they 
do not replace a decision maker’s ultimate judgment in 
fashioning an appropriate sentence.209 Instead, they provide the 
decision maker with an accurate depiction of Virginia’s modern 
 
 204. See Lanni, supra note 193, at 1775 (“The one task that juries 
indisputably perform better than judges is to reflect the ‘conscience of the 
community’ and to express public outrage at the transgression of community 
norms.”).  
 205. See Ross, supra note 196, at 728 (discussing the shift from 
rehabilitation goals of sentencing to retributive goals).   
 206. See Iontcheva, supra note 32, at 359 (“The key, therefore, is to devise 
sentencing standards (for example, statutory ranges or sentencing guidelines) 
that would enhance the coherence of jury sentencing decisions.”).  
 207. See supra Part I.A.  
 208. See supra Part I.A. 
 209. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(A) (2020) (describing the judge’s 
duty to review the relevant discretionary sentencing guidelines worksheets).   
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system of sentencing. Accepting the usefulness of this tool, judge 
concurrence rate with the guidelines has steadily increased 
since 1995 to what it is today: 83.4 percent.210  
By contrast, the current statutory scheme presents the jury 
with a distorted picture of the sentencing process by only 
providing the statutory minimum and maximum sentences for 
each offense.211 The current scheme inhibits a jury’s ability to 
consider whether a defendant should receive a sentence that is 
similar to other defendants convicted of the same offense and 
with similar criminal histories.   
A few years after parole was abolished in Virginia, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia held that sentencing juries shall be 
instructed on the abolition of parole for noncapital offenses.212 
The Supreme Court of Virginia based this holding in part on its 
finding that a jury should have “all significant and appropriate 
information that would avoid the necessity that it speculate or 
act upon misconceptions concerning the effect of its decision.”213 
That same concern should apply here. A jury, in performing its 
mission as the community’s conscience, should be aware of how 
the sentencing process works and the judicial branch’s role—
i.e., in Virginia, the jury’s role—in that process.214 Achieving 
this level of awareness requires allowing the jury to review 
guidelines worksheets. 
b. Bulwark Against Government Oppression 
When the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial, it found that “[a] right to jury 
 
 210. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.  
 211. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
 212. See Fishback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629, 634 (Va. 2000) 
(“[W]e will direct that henceforth juries shall be instructed, as a matter of law, 
on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony offenses committed on or after 
January 1, 1995 . . . .”).  
 213. Id. at 633.  
 214. See Hinton v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (Va. 1978) (“Under 
our system, the assessment of punishment is a function of the judicial branch 
of government, while the administration of such punishment is a 
responsibility of the executive department.”).  
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trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent 
oppression by the Government.”215 Drawing on the fundamental 
purpose of the right to a jury trial, some academics, including 
Professor Bertrall Ross, have identified jury sentencing’s 
potential to prevent government oppression at the sentencing 
phase.216 
Blocking the jury’s access to guidelines worksheets that are 
available to judges is not necessary to allow the jury to serve as 
a bulwark against government oppression. On the contrary, 
limiting the jury’s ability to use this tool enhances the 
government’s power over a defendant by encouraging 
defendants to waive their right to a jury trial. The ability to 
review the sentencing guidelines would provide the jury with 
more options to create a more lenient sentence.217 Virginia’s jury 
sentencing scheme instead pressures defendants to turn away 
from the jury and towards the government because juries are 
much more likely to recommend a sentence that is more severe 
than what the guidelines would recommend.218 
3. Corbitt, Jackson, and Virginia’s Jury Sentencing Scheme 
Corbitt appeared to limit the holding of Jackson to 
situations where the defendant is subject to a harsher sentence 
than he would be if he waived a jury trial.219 The death penalty 
provision in Jackson allowed the defendant to avoid the death 
penalty by waiving a jury trial.220 By contrast, in Corbitt, the 
 
 215. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968).  
 216. See Ross, supra note 196, at 728 (“It will also be argued that this role 
of the jury can coexist alongside a system of real offense sentencing that both 
individualizes sentencing and maintains the balance of power between the 
prosecutor and the judge at sentencing.”). 
 217. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 218. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 219. See supra notes 164–167 and accompanying text.  
 220. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968) (describing the 
death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnaping Act).  
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defendant could not avoid the possibility of a life sentence, the 
maximum sentence, if he waived a jury trial.221   
While Virginia defendants cannot avoid a statutory 
maximum punishment by waiving a jury trial, the data shows 
there is a much higher likelihood that they will receive a 
harsher punishment from a jury as opposed to a judge.222 Judges 
have increasingly relied on the guidelines to determine 
punishments.223 There is a strong likelihood that juries will 
deliver a sentence higher than what the sentencing guidelines 
would recommend; so, by waiving a jury trial, defendants have 
a significantly higher chance of receiving a lower punishment.224  
For example, had Mr. Tucker pled guilty or chosen to have 
a bench trial, he would have had a 79.6 percent chance of 
receiving a six-year sentence in line with the sentencing 
guidelines recommendation.225 Instead, he chose to assert his 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and faced a 46.6 percent 
chance of receiving a sentence higher than what the guidelines 
recommended.226 In the end he received a much more severe 
fifty-one-year sentence.227  
The facts of Jackson are clear: the death penalty provision 
of the Federal Kidnapping Act created two different statutory 
maximum punishments for those who asserted their right to a 
jury trial and those who waived that right.228 However, the 
Court’s holding in that case was not limited to this particular 
type of situation where the statutory scheme creates two 
distinct levels of punishment; rather, the Court tied its finding 
of an impermissible burden to its inability to find the provision 
 
 221. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 214–16 (1978) (describing 
the New Jersey homicide statutes).  
 222. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 223. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 224. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 225. See supra Table 1.  
 226. See supra Table 1.  
 227. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.  
 228. See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571 (describing the death penalty provision 
of the Federal Kidnaping Act).  
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necessary to carry out a legitimate purpose.229 A rigid factual 
rule like the one suggested in Corbitt encourages legislatures to 
devise more clever statutory schemes that, while they may not 
in fact create two different maximum sentences, they do so in 
effect.230  
That is the situation in Virginia under mandatory jury 
sentencing. Defendants, aware of the strong likelihood that a 
jury would give them a harsher sentence than a judge would, 
waive their right to a jury trial to avoid that harsher sentence.231 
This is the reality absent any preliminary negotiations with the 
government to waive a jury trial or plead guilty.  
III. NEXT STEPS 
The jury sentencing scheme established by the Virginia 
General Assembly in 1994 imposes an impermissible burden on 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial—a 
constitutional issue that defendants could attempt to address by 
challenging the validity of the system in court as the defendant 
successfully did in Jackson.232 By declaring the statutes that 
deny the jury the abilities to review the guidelines and to 
consider other ways to modify a sentence as unconstitutional, a 
court would permanently block the General Assembly from 
maintaining these aspects of jury sentencing.  
Virginia’s General Assembly is now attempting to fix the 
problem by passing legislation to amend the relevant sentencing 
statutes.233 While this is a positive step, the General Assembly 
 
 229. See id. at 582 (finding that the legitimate goal of limiting the 
imposition of the death penalty “can be achieved without penalizing those 
defendants who plead not guilty and demand jury trial”).  
 230. See Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 217 (noting that the statutory scheme in 
Jackson included the death penalty and a more lenient maximum sentence if 
the defendant pled guilty).  
 231. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 232. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 571 (1968) (describing the 
district court’s dismissal of count one of the indictment based on its finding 
that the Federal Kidnapping Act was unconstitutional because it “makes the 
‘risk of death’ the price for asserting the right to jury trial, and thereby 
‘impairs . . . free exercise’ of that constitutional right”).  
 233. See infra Part III.D.  
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and Governor during one session may choose to reform the 
sentencing scheme, but the General Assembly and Governor 
during another session could choose to reinstate the previous, 
unconstitutional scheme in response to, for example, a 
significant increase in the number of jury trials after reform, or 
in response to jurors struggling to properly use the guidelines.234  
This Part discusses how making jury sentencing optional 
for defendants would adequately safeguard a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right.235 This Part also explains what reforms—in 
the absence of optional jury sentencing—are necessary to give 
juries access to the guidelines and what procedures are 
necessary to facilitate effective use of the guidelines.236 Finally, 
this Part considers how reform would impact Virginia criminal 
sentencing and the future possibility that the General Assembly 
could pass legislation to return to a constitutionally problematic 
jury sentencing scheme.237  
A. Optional Jury Sentencing and Virginia Senate Bills 811 
and 5007 
Even if jurors could review sentencing guidelines 
worksheets, jurors would not face the same pressure from the 
General Assembly that judges—who are elected by the General 
Assembly238—feel to comply with the guidelines.239 Allowing a 
defendant to opt for a judge-created sentence would remove the 
danger of an extreme jury sentence and also avoid any problems 
that could stem from less pressure on juries to follow the 
guidelines.  
 
 234. See infra Parts III.B, IV.D. 
 235. See infra Part III.A.  
 236. See infra Part III.B–C.  
 237. See infra Part III.D. 
 238. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (“The judges of all other courts of record 
shall be chosen by the vote of the majority of the members elected to each 
house of the General Assembly for terms of eight years.”). 
 239. King & Noble, supra note 39, at 916. (“Judges and lawyers alike 
explained that guidelines adherence was linked to the judicial apprehension 
that upward departures would be considered negatively by the legislature at 
reelection.”).  
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Virginia and Kentucky stand alone as the only states that 
make jury sentencing mandatory after the guilt phase of a 
noncapital jury trial.240 The other four states that allow jury 
sentencing provide varying options to the defendant.241 For 
example, in Arkansas the defendant may waive jury sentencing 
but must first obtain consent from the court and prosecution.242 
In Texas, the judge will impose the sentence unless the 
defendant requests a jury sentence.243 While a system like that 
of Texas is more favorable to the defendant, either way, the 
possibility that a judge may first determine a sentence lifts 
pressure off of the defendant when he is deciding whether or not 
to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  
On February 5, 2020, Democrats on the Virginia Senate 
Judiciary Committee introduced Virginia Senate Bill 811 to 
allow juries to give both a verdict on guilt and a sentence at the 
same time with no additional sentencing hearing.244 However, 
senators dramatically altered the bill to instead end mandatory 
jury sentencing by making judge sentencing the default after 
jury trials, while preserving a defendant’s ability to choose to 
have a jury sentence.245 The House of Delegates later pushed the 
bill to 2021 for reconsideration, but Senate Democrats revived 
the effort to end mandatory jury sentencing in August 2020 
 
 240. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.  
 241. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 242. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (2020) (“After a jury finds guilt, the 
defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution and the consent of the court, 
may waive jury sentencing, in which case the court shall impose 
sentence . . . .”). 
 243. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 2(b) (West 2019) 
(explaining that the judge shall assess the punishment unless the defendant 
requests a jury sentence). 
 244. See S.B. 811, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (substituting 
the original bill that was titled “Sentencing in a criminal case; bifurcated jury 
trial”).  
 245. See id. (“If the jury finds the defendant guilty of an offense for which 
the death penalty may not be imposed and the accused has requested that the 
jury ascertain punishment of the offense . . . it shall fix the punishment as 
provided in § 19.2-295.1.”).  
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during a Special Session.246 After two months of back and forth 
between the Senate and House and a series of amendments, 
Virginia Senate Bill 5007, which would make jury sentencing 
optional, passed on October 16, 2020 with the caveat that the 
bill would not be enacted until July 2021.247 
Granting defendants the power to decide who will 
determine their sentence would give them the ability to choose 
between a decision maker who has complete access to resources 
like the sentencing guidelines and leniency modification tools (a 
judge) or one that does not (a jury). By choosing a judge, a 
defendant could avoid the risk discussed in this Note that a jury 
might recommend a harsher sentence than a judge.248 This 
legislative solution alone could adequately address that 
constitutional issue.  
B. Jury Access to the Sentencing Guidelines and Virginia 
Senate Bill 810 
Without optional jury sentencing, the next best reform is 
providing the jury with sentencing guidelines 
recommendations. One line in Virginia’s code blocks the jury’s 
access to the sentencing guidelines: “In cases tried by a jury, the 
jury shall not be presented any information regarding 
sentencing guidelines.”249 To address the constitutional issue 
that results from not allowing the jury to review the guidelines, 
the General Assembly could begin by simply deleting “not” from 
that sentence and giving the jury the ability to review completed 
sentencing guidelines worksheets.  
At the beginning of 2020 some Virginia senators attempted 
to do just that. On January 8, 2020, Senator Joseph Morrissey 
 
 246. See S.B. 5007, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020) (allowing 
the defendant to choose whether to have a jury sentence him or her).  
 247. See Ned Oliver, Virginia Lawmakers Vote to Reform 224-Year-Old 
Jury Sentencing Law, VA. MERCURY (Oct. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/6MJ2-
AJQ3 (describing Virginia Senate Bill 5007’s history and the debate 
surrounding it).  
 248. See supra Part I.B.  
 249. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (2020). 
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introduced Virginia Senate Bill 810,250 titled, “Discretionary 
sentencing guidelines worksheets; use by juries,” which seeks to 
add language to Virginia Code Section 19.2-295.1251 including 
that “the jury shall be presented with discretionary sentencing 
guidelines worksheets” and that “the court shall instruct the 
jury that the applicable discretionary sentencing guidelines 
worksheets are discretionary and not binding.”252 The bill also 
intends to modify the language of Virginia Code Section 
19.2-298.01,253 which prevents any party from presenting 
information regarding the guidelines worksheets to the jury, to 
instead allow juries to receive the applicable worksheets.254 
The proposed bill is not clear as to whether the jury would 
receive blank sentencing guidelines worksheets that the jury 
must complete or if the jury would receive completed sentencing 
guidelines worksheets that probationary officers currently 
complete.255 Requiring jurors to complete worksheets 
themselves would be problematic. The VCSC offers a variety of 
training programs to teach practitioners how to accurately score 
guidelines factors in the worksheets,256 which means that it 
would be impossible to effectively train juries in a more limited 
sentencing phase timeframe. Virginia Senate Bill 810 should 
clarify this point to avoid court confusion by definitively stating 
that probation officers will continue to complete the worksheets 
and then submit them to the jurors for review.  
 
 250. S.B. 810, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). 
 251. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1. 
 252. Va. S.B. 810, at 1.   
 253. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01.  
 254. Va. S.B. 810, at 1.  
 255. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(C) (2020) (“In felony cases, other 
than Class 1 felonies, tried by a jury and in felony cases tried by the court 
without a jury upon a plea of not guilty, the court shall direct a probation 
officer of such court to prepare the discretionary sentencing guidelines 
worksheets.”). 
 256. See Training, VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, https://perma.cc/77TG-4VTQ 
(providing a variety of training programs for attorneys and criminal justice 
professionals, including a $125 “Introduction to Sentencing Guidelines” course 
that teaches practitioners how to accurately score guidelines worksheets).  
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C. Jury Ability to Recommend Sentences Below the Statutory 
Minimum Level and Virginia Senate Bill 326 
Allowing juries to review completed sentencing guidelines 
worksheets would not benefit criminal defendants if juries 
cannot also recommend sentences below the statutory minimum 
sentence. Juries must also have the power to recommend that 
the judge suspend a sentence in full or in part and that the judge 
order that the defendant serve sentences for multiple offenses 
concurrently.  
Before Virginia abolished parole, offenders often served 
much less time than what the statutory minimum prescribed for 
a particular offense, so the guidelines—keyed to pre-parole 
abolition punishment levels—may therefore recommend a 
punishment range below the statutory minimum punishment 
for a particular offense.257 To remain in compliance with the 
guidelines, judges must frequently suspend a sentence or order 
that a defendant serve multiple offenses concurrently.258 For 
example, if a drug offense statutory minimum punishment is 
five years but the guidelines recommend one year of 
punishment, the judge must impose the five-year sentence but 
would need to suspend four years to comply with the guidelines 
recommendation. In this example, the shortest sentence the 
jury could recommend is the five-year statutory minimum. A 
judge can bring the jury recommended sentence into compliance 
with the guidelines by suspending the sentence him or 
herself;259 however, the reality is that judges are hesitant to 
modify jury sentences.260 Permitting juries to review guidelines 
worksheets must therefore coincide with allowing juries to 
recommend that the judge suspend a sentence in whole or in 
part and that the judge order that the defendant serve sentences 
for multiple offenses concurrently. 
Virginia Senator Creigh Deeds introduced a bill in January 
2020 that would give a jury those abilities. Virginia Senate Bill 
 
 257. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 258. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  
 259. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 260. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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326,261 titled “Sentencing proceeding by the jury after 
conviction; recommendation of leniency,” seeks to amend 
Section 19.2-295.1 of the Virginia Code262 by adding language 
that includes, “In ascertaining punishment, the jury may 
recommend that the sentence imposed be suspended in whole or 
in part, or that sentences imposed for multiple offenses be 
served concurrently, except where such suspension of sentence 
or concurrent service is prohibited by law.”263 If passed, this bill 
alone would increase the probability that juries would 
recommend sentences that comply with guidelines 
recommendations because it allows them to recommend 
sentences below the statutory minimum sentence.  
However, without the guidelines, juries would still have no 
way of knowing the extent to which (1) defendants sometimes 
receive punishments at or near the statutory minimum level, 
and (2) a judge would modify punishments through suspension 
or by ordering a defendant to serve sentences for multiple 
offenses concurrently. For example, a jury convicted Norell 
Sterling Ward of two counts of possessing heroin with intent to 
distribute and one count of conspiracy to distribute.264 The 
Virginia Criminal Code provides that each of those offenses 
requires a minimum sentence of five years and a maximum 
sentence of forty years.265 After factoring in Ward’s criminal 
history and other extraneous factors, the guidelines 
recommended range of punishment for all three counts was six 
years and four months to ten years and five months, with a 
 
 261. S.B. 326, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). 
 262. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (2020).  
 263. Va. S.B. 326, at 1.  
 264. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.  
 265. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-248(C) (“[A]ny person who violates this 
section with respect to a controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II 
shall upon conviction be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than 40 
years and fined not more than $500,000.”); Id. § 18.2-256 (providing that the 
punishment for a person found guilty of conspiring to commit any offense 
included in the article “may not be less than the minimum punishment nor 
exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission 
of which was the object of the conspiracy”).  
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midpoint of eight years and six months.266 That means the 
sentencing guidelines recommended a midpoint punishment of 
a little under three years for each offense, which is two years 
below the statutory five-year minimum level.267 If the judge in 
Ward’s case had sentenced Ward and complied with the 
guidelines—and, in 2017, judges complied 81.6 percent of the 
time268—he would have had at least two options if he imposed 
the statutory minimum level of five years for each offense. First, 
the judge could have ordered Ward to serve three five-year 
minimum sentences consecutively—a total of fifteen years—and 
suspend at least four years and seven months of the sentence to 
reach the high-end recommendation of ten years and five 
months.269 Second, he could have ordered Ward to serve two of 
the five-year sentences concurrently alongside the third 
sentence for a total punishment of ten years.270   
Instead, without the guidelines and with no ability to 
recommend suspending the sentence or ordering that the 
sentences be served concurrently, the jury recommended a 
sixty-five-year sentence.271 The jury went well beyond 
recommending the statutory minimum five-year punishment for 
each offense: at sixty-five years total, the jury recommended a 
little under twenty-two years for each offense.272 To reach the 
guidelines recommended range with its sixty-five-year 
recommended punishment, the jury would have needed to 
recommend that the judge suspend at least fifty-four years and 
 
 266. VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9. To 
comply with the guidelines, a decision maker does not need to impose the 
midpoint; rather, the decision maker must impose a sentence within the 
recommended range, which can be slightly below or above the midpoint. See 
2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 12 (defining concurrence with 
guidelines).   
 267. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.  
 268. 2017 VIRGINIA CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT 27, 
https://perma.cc/N897-3YVW (PDF). 
 269. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9 
(recommending a high-end punishment of ten years and five months). 
 270. See id. (recommending a high-end punishment of ten years and five 
months). 
 271. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 272. Id. Sixty-five divided by three is 21.67.  
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seven months to reach the high-end recommendation of ten 
years and five months.273 Alternatively, if the jury had 
recommended that Ward serve all three sentences concurrently, 
the total recommended sentence would have been around 
twenty-two years.274 Still, the jury would have needed to 
recommend that the judge suspend at least eleven years and 
seven months of the sentence.275  
In sum, the jury still has a number of hoops to jump through 
to reach guidelines recommended ranges with no ability to 
review guidelines worksheets. Juries would likely fail to (1) 
recommend a sentence at or near statutory minimum levels, or 
(2) recommend sufficient modifications to the sentence. As a 
result, recurrent jury sentence divergence from guidelines 
recommendations would persist.276 While jury concurrence with 
guidelines may rise slightly in the interim, this statistic would 
continue to pale in comparison to judge concurrence rates, which 
have steadily risen over the past twenty-five years to 83.9 
percent in 2019.277  
Accordingly, the proposed changes in both Virginia Senate 
Bill 810 and Virginia Senate Bill 326 must both be in effect to 
address the constitutional problems that stem from Virginia’s 
mandatory jury sentencing scheme.278 Without the ability to 
recommend sentence suspensions or concurrent sentences, a 
jury would be unable to recommend a sentencing guidelines 
recommendation that falls below the statutory minimum 
punishment level. Without the sentencing guidelines, a jury 
would have no way of understanding the extent to which judges 
have modified sentences to levels well below what a statute may 
command.  
Naturally, passing legislation like Virginia Senate Bills 326 
and 810 in addition to Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007 would 
be the best-case scenario: together, the bills would place the 
 
 273. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING SUMMARY, supra note 9 (recommending 
a high-end punishment of ten years and five months).  
 274. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 275. See VCSC WARD SENTENCING GUIDELINES SUMMARY, supra note 9 
(providing the high-end recommendation for Ward).  
 276. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 277. 2019 VCSC REPORT, supra note 40, at 29.  
 278. See supra Part II. 
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judge and jury on roughly equal footing while still reserving the 
ultimate choice of who will determine the sentence for the 
defendant. Nevertheless, each would represent a significant 
step towards lifting the burden on a Virginia defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right. 
D. Jury Sentencing After Legislative Reform 
Virginia Senate Democrats acted rapidly at the beginning 
of the 2020 Regular Session by passing a “cascade” of bills.279 
Among those bills were Virginia Senate Bills 326, 810, and 811, 
all of which the Virginia Senate narrowly passed on February 
11, 2020—only one or two Republicans joined the Senate 
Democrats to pass each of the bills, demonstrating the 
contentiousness of the issue of jury sentencing but also the 
potential for bipartisan cooperation.280 While the Senate passed 
these three bills, the House of Delegates Courts of Justice 
Committee decided to push consideration of the bills until 
2021—sending them to the Virginia Crime Commission for 
further study.281 Nevertheless, Senate Democrats successfully 
 
 279. See Gregory S. Schneider et al., Virginia Democrats Push Liberal 
Agenda—with a Dose of Caution, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc
/6J7M-6QAC (describing the “hundreds of bills” Senate Democrats passed in 
the early 2020 Regular Session). 
 280. See SB 326 Sentencing Proceeding by the Jury After Conviction; 
Recommendation of Leniency, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/4C85-
YAZP [hereinafter SB 326 VLIS] (providing that the bill passed in the Virginia 
Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-two votes in favor of the bill and 
eighteen votes against the bill); SB 810 Discretionary Sentencing Guidelines 
Worksheets; Use by Juries, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/4NXT-
EPF2 [hereinafter SB 810 VLIS] (providing that the bill passed in the Virginia 
Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-two votes in favor of the bill and 
eighteen votes against the bill); SB 811 Sentencing in a Criminal Case; 
Bifurcated Jury Trial, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/2X2C-CNJ2 
[hereinafter SB 811 VLIS] (providing that the amended bill passed in the 
Virginia Senate on February 11, 2020 with twenty-three votes in favor of the 
bill and seventeen votes against the bill). 
 281. See SB 326 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House Courts of 
Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote on 
February 24, 2020); SB 810 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House 
Courts of Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote 
on March 2, 2020); SB 811 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing that the House 
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made a second push to end mandatory jury sentencing during a 
2020 Special Session, assuring that mandatory jury sentencing 
will end in Virginia in July 2021.282 
During the Regular Session, the Courts of Justice 
Committee likely pushed the three bills back to 2021 in response 
to concerns with the speed at which the Senate moved to make 
major changes to jury sentencing. During a Senate Judiciary 
Committee meeting on February 5, 2020, Stafford County 
Commonwealth’s Attorney Eric Olsen spoke in opposition to 
Virginia Senate Bill 811, which sought to end mandatory jury 
sentencing.283 Mr. Olsen, also speaking on behalf of the Virginia 
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys, called the amended 
bill an “extreme step” without an additional study.284 He went 
on to state that “in a community, with your fellow citizens, you 
are entitled to have your fellow citizens decide your fate on 
issues of criminal justice,” and he argued that this bill, if passed, 
would demonstrate a lack of “trust” in juries.285 During the 
Senate’s Regular Session on February 11, Senator Mark 
Obenshain of Rockingham County also spoke in opposition to 
Virginia Senate Bill 811.286 Senator Obenshain argued that the 
bill was a “significant change of policy and it is not something 
we should do without giving it some thought” and that, if 
passed, the bill was something “we will regret doing with this 
 
Courts of Justice Committee decided to continue the bill to 2021 by voice vote 
on March 2, 2020).  
 282. See SB 5007 Criminal Cases; Sentencing Reform, Procedure for Trial 
by Jury, Etc., VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., https://perma.cc/Y5BH-255G [hereinafter 
SB 5007 VLIS] (providing that after nearly two months of debate, both the 
House of Delegates and Senate agreed to end mandatory jury sentencing after 
adding an enactment date of July 1, 2021).   
 283. Feb. 5, 2020 Hearing on S.B. 811 Before the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) at 1:23:25, https://
perma.cc/FL5E-3S67 (discussing the amended bill and allowing community 
members to voice support or opposition for the bill). 
 284. Id.  
 285. Id.  
 286. See Feb. 11, 2020 Regular Session, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 
2020) at Part 1 2:33:27, https://perma.cc/FL5E-3S67 (showing the full Senate 
debate on Senate Bill 811 and other bills).  
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speed and dispatch.”287 The Senate then passed Virginia Senate 
Bill 811 with twenty-three votes in favor of the bill and 
seventeen votes against.288  
Despite the House’s decision to push Virginia Senate Bills 
326, 810, and 811 to 2021, Senate Democrats successfully 
passed Virginia Senate Bill 5007 during a 2020 Special Session, 
assuring that mandatory jury sentencing will end in Virginia in 
July 2021.289 Ending mandatory jury sentencing represents a 
landmark departure from Virginia’s longtime support of the 
controversial practice,290 and the reform could have a sizeable 
impact on Virginia’s criminal justice system.  
Theoretically, consistent with comments made by those who 
opposed Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007, requests for jury 
trials could rise dramatically if jury sentencing became optional, 
overwhelming court caseloads. Compared with Texas, a state 
with optional jury sentencing similar to the proposed system in 
Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007, the percentage of 
convictions adjudicated by bench trials in Virginia was over 
twice as large as that of Texas.291 A large percentage of 
defendants in Virginia that would have previously requested a 
bench trial could instead request a jury trial. As a result, the 
percentage of convictions adjudicated by jury trials could 
increase significantly. However, as the sponsors and supporters 
of Senate Bill 5007 explained during the Special Session, the 
reality is that it is unlikely that jury trials will rise dramatically 
given how infrequent they are in other optional jury sentencing 
states.292 The more likely scenario will be a moderate initial 
 
 287. Id.  
 288. See SB 811 VLIS, supra note 280 (providing the history of Virginia 
Senate Bill 811).  
 289. See Oliver, supra note 247 (explaining the history of Virginia Senate 
Bill 5007).  
 290. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.  
 291. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.  
 292. Sept. 25, 2020 Hearing on S.B. 5007 Before the House of Delegates 
Comm. on Appropriations, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2020) at 
10:40:47, https://perma.cc/5R32-5Z8U (discussing the potential financial 
impact of Virginia Senate Bill 5007). 
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uptick in the number of jury trials, followed by a downward 
trend to levels similar to other optional jury sentencing states.293  
Another potential situation that could prompt reinstating 
mandatory jury sentencing could be a change in political control 
of the General Assembly. However, which political party has 
control may have little to do with the matter. When Virginia 
first passed truth-in-sentencing reforms in 1994—including 
abolishing parole and denying the jury the ability to review the 
sentencing guidelines—Democrats held majorities in both the 
House of Delegates and the Senate.294  
Without the reforms contained in Virginia Senate Bills 326, 
810, 811, and 5007, the constitutional issue discussed in this 
Note would persist in Virginia, and defendants would be stuck 
between choosing to have a jury trial or waiving their Sixth 
Amendment right to ensure a judge determines their 
sentences.295 The best way to reform Virginia jury sentencing is 
to make jury sentencing optional for defendants, the solution 
proposed by Virginia Senate Bills 811 and 5007.296 But if 
mandatory jury sentencing returns, passing both Virginia 
Senate Bills 326 and 810—allowing juries to review completed 
guidelines worksheets and giving juries the ability to 
recommend that a judge suspend a sentence or order a 
defendant to serve multiple sentences concurrently—would also 
resolve the constitutional issue, provided that the General 
Assembly make the suggested edit to Virginia Senate Bill 810 
that the jury receive completed guidelines worksheets.297 
Passing and preserving these reforms is essential to resolve the 
constitutional issue discussed in this Note, and critical for 
criminal defendants in Virginia.   
 
 293. Id.  
 294. See Party Control of Virginia State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://
perma.cc/7MES-EBLT (illustrating that in 1994, Democrats controlled the 
General Assembly, while the Governor was a Republican).  
 295. See supra Part II.  
 296. See supra Part III.A. 
 297. See supra Part III.B–C. 
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CONCLUSION 
Virginia legislators are now attuned to the potential 
problems created by jury sentencing schemes and in particular 
the detrimental impact that mandatory jury sentencing has had 
on Virginia criminal defendants for decades. As a result of 
successful reform efforts, Virginia will become one of five states 
with an optional jury sentencing scheme.298  
This Note focused on Virginia’s jury sentencing scheme, but 
the issues discussed are relevant for all states that allow or that 
could choose to allow the jury to first recommend a sentence for 
the defendant. Any proponent of jury sentencing—academic or 
political—must reckon with the possibility that political actors 
could exploit the system to threaten a defendant’s right to a jury 
trial.  
Legislative reform or abolition of jury sentencing schemes 
may shield a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right, but the fact 
remains that future legislative action could reverse that 
reform.299 Advocates must therefore continue to monitor jury 
sentencing statutory schemes and the legislative bodies that 
create them, holding them accountable by referencing the 
harmful effect that jury sentencing can have on a defendant’s 







 298. See supra Part III.  
 299. See supra Part III.D.  
 300. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968) (“Our 
conclusion is that in the American States, as in the federal judicial system, a 
general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right, essential 
for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are 
provided for all defendants.”).  
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Table 3: Judge Modification of Jury Sentence Rate 
 




2004 16 2004 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35, 
https://perma.cc/Q4DC-ZPXM 
(PDF). 
2005 24 2005 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 28, 
https://perma.cc/M695-72AN 
(PDF). 
2006 20 2006 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 30, 
https://perma.cc/PP6H-9XVS 
(PDF). 
2007 22 2007 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 38, 
https://perma.cc/8KTT-8BYL 
(PDF). 
2008 17 2008 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 32, 
https://perma.cc/3NVB-BMY7 
(PDF). 
2009 24 2009 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35, 
https://perma.cc/Q7C3-EBA6 
(PDF). 
2010 25 2010 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 37, 
https://perma.cc/9SF6-P4V7 
(PDF). 
2011 19 2011 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27, 
https://perma.cc/3QDE-VFPP 
(PDF). 
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2012 22 2012 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 24, 
https://perma.cc/7VW4-F94K 
(PDF). 
2013 17 2013 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 32, 
https://perma.cc/HER4-DVYZ 
(PDF). 
2014 20 2014 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 35, 
https://perma.cc/W94M-PQFCf 
(PDF). 
2015 22 2015 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 37, 
https://perma.cc/7MVK-GB9B 
(PDF). 
2016 16 2016 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 28, 
https://perma.cc/79Q9-E3ME 
(PDF). 
2017 14 2017 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27, 
https://perma.cc/N897-3YVW 
(PDF). 
2018 16 2018 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 27, 
https://perma.cc/MM3U-CPU7 
(PDF). 
2019 9 2019 VA. CRIM. SENT’G 
COMMISSION ANN. REP. 29, 
https://perma.cc/D3NT-GA6D 
(PDF). 
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Table 4: Correlation Between Jury Aggravation Rate and 
Judge Modification Rate 
 





2004 44 16 
2005 38 24 
2006 39 20 
2007 48 22 
2008 44 17 
2009 52 24 
2010 52 25 
2011 51 19 
2012 50 22 
2013 49 17 
2014 53.3 20 
2015 47.4 22 
2016 48 16 
2017 46 14 
2018 49.8 16 
2019 36.7 9 







 301. See Appendix Table 1.  
 302. See Appendix Table 3.  
